and objective formulations of the entrapment defense is the underlying policy purpose each purports to serve. The policy emphasized by the subjective approach is that innocent individuals should not be led into crime by the police. 15 The objective approach is animated exclusively by a concern with whether or not the conduct of the police was acceptable." 6 Of course, these policy goals are not mutually exclusive. What differentiates them is the subject on which they focus. The subjective view looks to the character of the individual defendant, while the objective view looks to the actions of law enforcement officers.-' These inquiries can yield identical 8 or contrary 9 results.
After a brief review of the facts of the DeLorean and Abscam cases, this Comment attempts to demonstrate that the subjective approach to entrapment is theoretically untenable because it is based on the rationale that the defendant, although induced to commit a crime by
Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat: The Constitutional Status of the Entrapment
Defense, 74 YALE L.J. 942, 953 (1965) (suggesting an alternative system in which "[tihe fact of a successful solicitation would not in itself give rise to criminal liability; it would only be relevant as evidence of an independently existing course of criminal conduct") [hereinafter cited as Note, The Serpent Beguiled Me]. One writer has concluded that, whatever analysis is applied, the entrapment defense is a "fundamentally erroneous doctrine." Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal Justice Dilemma, 5 Sup. CT. REV. 111, 113 (1981) ("[E]ntrapment doctrine is one of a number of adaptive mechanisms which compensate for our failure to develop a coherent theory of blame and choice to regulate the imposition of criminal punishment.").
1" See Rotenberg, supra note 12, at 898. 16 See id. at 899. 17 The subjective view asks whether or not the defendant is an "otherwise innocent" individual, Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448 (1932) , who "was induced to commit [a crime] by the Government," United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973) . This approach endeavors to establish whether or not the defendant was "predisposed"-that is, whether the offered inducement merely provided a welcome opportunity to an existing criminal or created a new criminal. See, e.g., Russell, 411 U.S. at 429. The objective approach is concerned with police impropriety, see Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), and attempts to evaluate the investigating officer's conduct without inquiring into the defendant's state of mind, see Russell, 411 U.S. at 441 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The "objective" measure of police conduct is generally an inquiry into whether or not an "average lawabiding citizen" would have been lured into criminality by a similar inducement. See Park, supra note 13, at 173.
"8 See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958) . Sherman was a recovering heroin addict who met government informant Kalchinian in a doctor's office where both were seeking help for their narcotics habits. Kalchinian, feigning serious withdrawal symptoms, prevailed upon Sherman to secure some narcotics for him. Only after repeated pleadings did Sherman give in. The majority held that he was an otherwise innocent individual who was not predisposed to crime. See id. at 373. The concurring minority, per Justice Frankfurter, stated that the impropriety of the informant's action barred prosecution of the case. See id. at 383 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 19 See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) . The Court applied the subjective test and held that there had been no entrapment. See id. at 429, 436. The dissenters would have found entrapment based on an application of the objective test. See id. at 438-39 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 441-47 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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REPLACING THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE government officials, is "otherwise innocent." The Comment argues that identifying and curbing undesirable police conduct is the only sound goal of the entrapment defense. The objective approach does not accomplish this goal because it presupposes a universal standard of morality by which it measures the reactions of suspects. A proper approach would define a permissible standard of conduct by which to measure police behavior.
The use of encouragement tactics by undercover agents can pose grave threats to individual privacy and integrity. 20 At the same time, it is clear that as long as the federal government continues to prosecute victimless or consensual crimes, such as bribery, gambling, or narcotics trafficking, law enforcement authorities must be allowed to use undercover tactics. 2 ' In order to balance individual rights and liberties with legitimate law enforcement objectives, Congress should limit the use of inducement techniques to situations in which they can be fully justified. This Comment argues that police encouragement tactics should be allowed only when law enforcement officials can demonstrate reasonable suspicion that the suspect is involved in ongoing criminal activity. Further, the Comment proposes that entrapment operations be subject to a warrant requirement, and that a warrant be issued only after a showing of reasonable suspicion. Compliance wfth the warrant, as well as the basis for its issuance, would be evaluated in a pretrial motion, and the defense of entrapment would be abolished. I . SOME ANECDOTAL BACKGROUND
A. John Z. DeLorean
According to newspaper accounts of the DeLorean trial, by 1980 20 See Dix, supra note 14, at 211-12 (asserting that undercover operations have an impact on the individual's sense of personal privacy, privacy in interpersonal relationships, and the individual's first amendment interest in freedom of association); see also S. 804, supra note 10, at S2798 (requiring "probable cause [rather than reasonable suspicion] to believe that the [undercover] operation is necessary to detect or prevent specific acts of criminality" if the operation involves (1) infiltration of a political, governmental, religious, or news organization, or (2) impersonation of an attorney, physician, clergyman, or newsperson, and "there is a significant risk that another individual will enter into a confidential relationship with that person"). 21 See SELECT COMMrTTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 11 (stating that because "organized crime and consensual crimes such as narcotics trafficking, fencing of stolen property, and political corruption" are the main challenges of law enforcement today, and because criminals are "increasingly powerful and sophisticated . . ., some use of the undercover technique is indispensable to the achievement of effective law enforcement"). But see EDWARDS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 10 ("not at all clear that comparable resources devoted to traditional, reactive investigatory methods would not be as effective as the undercover techniques" in curbing consensual crimes).
1198

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the DeLorean Motor Company was in dire financial straits.1 2 John Z. DeLorean, the company's chairman, desperately needed ten million dollars in order to salvage the company." Around this time, former neighbor and occasional narcotics dealer James Timothy Hoffman got in touch with DeLorean and invited him to participate in a major cocaine transaction. 24 Hoffman, an admitted perjurer 25 who had been working as an FBI informant for some time prior to the DeLorean incident, 28 said that DeLorean was the first to raise the subject of drugs: DeLorean wanted to make money quickly in a big narcotics deal and hoped that Hoffman would be able to arrange something. 7 Before Hoffman came forward with his allegations, the FBI had no reason to believe that DeLorean was involved in the drug scene in any way. 2 The original scenario devised by the participants in the cocaine transaction was the following: DeLorean would invest two million dollars toward the purchase of the cocaine and would make as much as sixty million dollars in profit from its resale. 29 This arrangement became unworkable, however, when DeLorean revealed that he would have to withdraw from the op6ration due to his inability to raise the two million dollars. 30 At this time, either FBI agent Benedict Tisa s ' or Hoffman 3 2 offered an alternative. Under the new proposal, DeLorean simply had to put up two million dollars worth of collateral, which included several sports cars, -spare parts, and other property. 3 DeLorean also signed over the entire voting stock of DeLorean Motor Company, Inc., to the federal agents who were posing as drug deal- ers. 3 ' Finally, Tisa recommended that DeLorean be sure to launder any profits from the transaction through one of his companies. 3 5 The jury had little trouble acquitting DeLorean. 6 Interviews with several jurors after the trial indicated that the acquittal was based both on disapproval of the government's tactics in its investigation of DeLorean and on the conclusion that the government had failed to prove that DeLorean had committed a crime.7 Because DeLorean was prosecuted in federal court, the judge instructed the jury to evaluate the entrapment defense in accordance with the subjective view. 38 However, it seems from the jurors' remarks that they followed the objective approach instead. 9 Those jurors who discussed the entrapment issue with reporters emphasized the impropriety of the operation, not DeLorean's character. 40 One juror expressed the view that the FBI went after DeLorean only because he was an influential person. 4 ' There were several indications that the agents viewed DeLorean as a highly desirable arrest. One agent referred to DeLorean as his "meal ticket." ' 42 Hoffman boasted to anxious agents two months before DeLorean's arrest that he was "going to get [DeLorean] for you guys." ' 4 3 Tisa testified that the FBI agents intended to arrest DeLorean when the cocaine was delivered regardless of how he reacted-unless, of course, his response was to call the Drug Enforcement Agency or the FBI. 4 4 It was undoubtedly the spirit of the hunt that led Tisa to report to FBI headquarters that DeLorean was "involved in large scale narcotics transactions, in addition to the laundering . . . of large amounts of illegally received in- 5' "Stings" are far less complex than the operations on which this Comment focuses. In setting up a sting, undercover operatives develop a front for a supposedly illegal enterprise, such as a fencing operation, and leak the news that there is an illegal enterprise operating in the neighborhood. The agents then wait for interested parties to arrive. No inducement or encouragement is required, and the very arrival of the parties indicates their guilt. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 958-59 (statement of Jerry J. Berman, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union). Although stings do not raise many of the concerns implicated by the more sophisticated entrapment techniques, they do, at the very least, involve the expenditure of scarce resources. For that reason alone, stings should be initiated only when there is reasonable suspicion of ongoing criminality of a particular kind in the targeted locality. cials who would use their influence on the sheiks' behalf." 2 Through Errichetti and other middlemen," 3 the Asylum Scenario successfully ensnared Congressmen Michael "Ozzie" Myers, 8 Raymond Lederer, 5 Frank Thompson," 8 John Murphy, 6 7 Richard Kelly," and John Jenrette," each of whom promised to introduce private relief legislation for the sheiks in exchange for $50,000 or more. 70 The fourth phase of Abscam was initiated shortly before Abdul Enterprises closed its doors forever.
7 1 Turning his sights to the municipal government of Philadelphia, Weinberg contacted an associate from his earlier adventures and told him that the sheiks were "'looking to build a hotel' in Philadelphia," 7' 2 and would need contacts among local officials. These contacts turned out to be members of the city council, who were asked to lobby their colleagues concerning the desirability of the sheiks' proposal. The venture had a double appeal for the Philadelphia defendants since it not only put money in their pockets, but promised considerable economic gain for the city as well. 73 Councilman Harry Jannotti seemed hesitant about accepting his 
REPLACING THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
$10,000 bribe: he repeatedly asked the FBI agents about the legitimacy of the project. 4 Jannotti was assured that taking the money was essential to maintaining the good will of the sheiks. 5 The sheiks considered it very important to make friends with the people they were doing business with, and the only way to do that was with money. This way of doing business might seem unusual to an American, admitted FBI agent Wald, but was nevertheless characteristic of the "Arab mind.1 78 Reassured, Jannotti took the money."
The Abscam defendants were less fortunate than John DeLorean. In every Abscam case, the defendants were convicted by the juries, and every conviction was upheld on appeal. In both Councilman Jannotti's and Congressman Kelly's trials, the presiding judge dismissed the indictments after the jury's finding of guilt 78 but was reversed by the appellate court." Most of the defendants appealed their convictions to the Supreme Court, but certiorari was denied in every instance. 8 "
II. CURRENT DOCTRINE
A. The Subjective Approach
When the Supreme Court first recognized the entrapment defense in the landmark decision of Sorrells v. United States,"' the majority "I See id. at 587-89. Jannotti's concern with legitimacy was with whether the project would be used for gambling; Schwartz's concern was whether it would be used for "immoral purposes." Id. at 601. 75 See id. at 588-89. endorsed the subjective view of the doctrine. The Supreme Court reiterated its approval of the subjective approach in Sherman v. United States 2 and, more recently, in United States v. Russell. 3 The subjective approach inquires into the state of mind and character of the defendant in order to determine whether entrapment has occurred and condemns police practices only when they lead to the creation of "new" criminals. " [T] he controlling question [is] whether the defendant is a person otherwise innocent whom the Government is seeking to punish for an alleged offense which is the product of the creative activity of its own officials." 4 To determine whether the defendant is an "otherwise innocent" individual, a court must ascertain whether or not the defendant was "predisposed" to commit the crime.
8 5 Entrapment will be found where "the officials of the Government . . . implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they may prosecute." 8 " Police are not permitted to create crime or criminals, but such creation of crime is thought to be possible only in the case of the nondisposed. 8 7 An offer that, when made to a nondisposed defendant, is considered impermissible police activity, is looked upon as one simulated opportunity in a series of many authentic ones when a predisposed defendant is involved., Thus, under the subjective approach, any defendant found to be predisposed will be convicted regardless of the excessiveness of the inducement, and any nondisposed defendant will be acquitted no matter how reasonable, objectively considered, the inducement may appear. 8 9 Although both the predisposed and the nondisposed have been led into crime, the former is simply careless-an "unwary criminal"-while the friended the defendant by telling him that they had been in the same division in the army during World War I, asked Sorrells three times to get the whiskey. " See Donnelly, supra note 12, at 1108; Seidman, supra note 14, at 118. One commentator has persuasively argued that "little basis exists for predicting how likely it is that such an offense would be committed if law enforcement personnel did not interfere." Dix, supra note 14, at 256. 89 See Seidman, supra note 14, at 115.
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latter is naive and entitled to protection-an "unwary innocent." 90 To prove its case, the prosecution must somehow demonstrate the defendant's predisposition at the time of the alleged inducement. 91 One method is to demonstrate by the facts of the incident itself the defendant's "ready complaisance" to commit the offense. 9 2 To show this, the prosecution need only point to the defendant's ready acceptance of the proposal, seeming knowledge of how to commit the crime, or any information that might have been revealed in the midst of the transaction regarding the defendant's criminal propensities. 9 3
Although this approach may not seem problematic at first, it is fatally circular. For, to have any logic at all, the predisposition inquiry must depend on the defendant's state of mind prior to the offense. It is hard to see how the defendant's behavior in the course of committing the crime advances this inquiry. Unless the defendant has been physically coerced into accepting the inducement, it is a mere form of words to assert that there was no disposition to err at the very time the criminal design was consummated. 9 " Knowledge of how to commit the crime 90 Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372. 9' Once the entrapment defense has been raised, the burden of production is on the defendant, who must show that the crime was "induced" by a government agent or informant. Sagansky v. United States, 358 F.2d 195, 202-03 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 816 (1966). The prosecution then has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed and "ready and willing [and] 9' See Park, supra note 13, at 248. The predisposition inquiry varies from case to case and court to court. Some defendants are acquitted because they commit offenses only after showing much hesitation. See, e.g., Sherman, 356 U.S. at 373; Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 439-40. In other instances, the commission of the act is enough to show predisposition. Mr. Jannotti's repeated expressions of concern about the legitimacy of his transaction with the sheiks would seem to be enough to suggest a lack of "ready complaisance." See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. But neither the jury nor the appellate court were convinced. See United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 601-03 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982) . Courts are understandably loath to find a lack of "ready complaisance" where ambiguous behavior can be explained by an abundance of caution on the part of defendants. Several Abscam defendants relied on the use of ambiguous language to mask their knowledge of the illegality of their transactions. See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 844 (2d Cir. 1982) (Congressman Thompson's oblique comment-"You look after that for me will you?"-to attorney Criden in reference to the briefcase of money he received, signified not ignorance of the briefcase's contents, but a deliberate attempt by Thompson to mask his knowledge should his ac-1205 and information about the defendant's criminal history are useful only in relation to past crimes; they do not indicate predisposition to commit the present crime. One commentator calls the inquiry into the defendant's state of mind at the time of the offense "evidentiary bootstrapping," ' 95 complaining that "the defendant is said to be predisposed because he committed the act, and then is held responsible for the act because he was predisposed." 9 The prosecutor may also try to prove predisposition by reference to the defendant's character. This technique raises what is perhaps the most persistent criticism of the subjective approach: its reliance on normally inadmissible evidence such as reputation, rumor, and criminal history, including prior arrests as well as convictions. 97 This kind of evidence, which is usually considered unreliable and highly prejudicial, 98 can chill the use of the entrapment defense by those who think that the risk of putting such information before the jury outweighs their tion be discovered), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983).
. Gershman, supra note 14, at 1581. Russell, 411 U.S. at 443 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (entrapment test that depends on predisposition allows unreliable and highly prejudicial hearsay, suspicion, and rumor evidence to be introduced).
,S Russell, 411 U.S. at 443 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 459 (Roberts, J., concurring). Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence regarding the defendant's character and past bad acts is not admissible to prove the prosecution's case. FED. R. EVID. 404. Our legal system maintains this practice because it recognizes that
[t]he natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal-whether judge or jury-is to give excessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge or to take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation, irrespective of the accused's guilt of the present charge.
1A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 58.2 (Tillers rev. ed.
1983
). An exception to the rule on the admissibility of evidence of character and past bad acts occurs when the defendant introduces evidence of her own character. In this instance, the prosecutor is given the opportunity to rebut. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1). Because the theory of the subjective approach focuses on the "otherwise innocent" nature of the defendant, use of the entrapment defense implicitly raises the question of character. Therefore, it is consistent, strictly speaking, with the Federal Rules to allow the introduction of such evidence under the entrapment defense.
[Vol. 133:1193 REPLACING THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE chances of prevailing on the entrapment issue. The defendant may end up being judged not on the basis of the act for which the indictment was secured but for "a general criminal depravity and wickedness." 99 The Supreme Court has dismissed this objection, however, stating that "if the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrapment he cannot complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing on that issue. If . . . he suffers a disadvantage, he has brought it upon himself by reason of the nature of the defense." ' 00 Reliance on such evidence can lead to two laws of entrapment-one for those with no criminal history and good reputations, and another for defendants with bad reputations and prior records. Two defendants, "solicited at the same time in the same manner," 1 0 1 can receive different verdicts because of their different personal histories. Thus, the entrapment defense protects only the otherwise innocent who have had no prior contact with the law, thereby undermining a basic tenet of our criminal justice system-that "[p]ast crimes do not forever outlaw the criminal." 0 2
Furthermore, an approach that allows a finding of predisposition to be based on evidence of the defendant's past conduct takes a cynical view of "[t]he whole ameliorative hopes of modem penology," 10 3 by assuming, "to the consternation of penologists, that the defendant has not been reformed." ' ' Thus, the concern that there is no way out of the criminal justice system once an individual gets into it is explicitly sanctioned by law, and the search for the "otherwise innocent" becomes a circumstantial rather than a moral inquiry.
Under the subjective approach to entrapment, the prevailing defendant is found innocent, even though all of the elements of the crime have been satisfied. 05 There are other instances in our criminal law "Donnelly, supra note 12, at 1108. 100 Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451-52. 101 Sherman, 356 U.S. at 383 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) . 102 Id. Theoretically, this approach might enable a law enforcement officer to tempt with impunity an individual whose prior record and bad reputation were known to him, confident that such an individual would be unlikely to prevail on the entrapment defense. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 443-44 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Rotenberg, supra note 12, at 898. 103 Sherman, 356 U.S. at 383 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
104 Rotenberg, supra note 12, at 898.
105 Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 452. In Sorrells, the Court developed an implausible fiction to get around this problem: in the guise of statutory interpretation, the Court held that Congress did not intend government officials to enforce the prohibition statute under which Sorrells was indicted in a manner that would lure otherwise innocent people into committing crimes. See id. at 448-50. Justice Roberts considered this construction "strained and unwarranted." Id. at 456 (Roberts, J., concurring).
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where an individual who has satisfied all of the factual elements of a crime may be acquitted. Self-defense, duress, and necessity rest on the premise that the defendant has somehow been deprived of all choice and has no control over her actions." 0 6 Similarly, the insanity defense is based on the premise that the defendant was incapable of making responsible or reasoned decisions, and thus could not form the intent necessary to be considered guilty of the crime. 10 7 These exceptions to the normal rules of criminal responsibility seem to be premised on a notion that individuals can be held responsible only for actions taken voluntarily.
In the police encouragement situation, the individual's freedom to act is manipulated; her will and self-control are assaulted; she may feel driven to do things she will later regret. However, she has not been entirely deprived of choice or free will. When temptation comes, she can still say "NO!" 8 When the weak-willed are manipulated into committing crimes by private individuals, they are not permitted to raise the entrapment defense. 1 0 9 Consequently, it is reasonable to condude that the only logical basis for the entrapment defense is the role of the police in the creation of the crime, rather than the belief that a defendant has been deprived of freedom of choice and is therefore innocent.
When the courts acquit defendants who are factually guilty, and who have been neither coerced nor deprived of their faculties in any tangible way, our whole system of guilt and innocence is thrown into question. If entrapment doctrine really relies on the innocence of the defendant rather than on the conduct of the police officer, the theory of acquitting those who are factually guilty but "otherwise innocent" arguably should extend further. For example, it might be extended to excuse those individuals who commit property crimes as a response to poverty. These individuals have been hurt by the economic system, and prior to engaging in crime they were "otherwise innocent." Their guilt is attributable to their circumstances. Furthermore, unless one subscribes to a theory of inherent criminality, almost any first offender is 107 See id. § 36 at 268-71. The insanity defense, which if successful results in the commitment of the defendant to a mental institution, is also based on a desire to provide special treatment for certain criminal defendants. Thus, the result of a successful insanity defense is different from that of a successful plea of self-defense. Id.
"' But ef infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text (ability to refuse temptation does not protect privacy or reputation).
109 See Russell, 411 U.S. at 442 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Park, supra note 13, at 240-43 (explaining and justifying the "private-person exception to the entrapment defense").
[Vol. 133:1193 REPLACING THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE "otherwise innocent" before breaking the law.
Because of the difficulties involved in any attempt to give substance to the concept of the "otherwise innocent," it is an extremely shaky foundation on which to rest the entrapment defense. The method of determining the defendant's state of mind pursuant to this doctrine is tenuous, circular, and unfair. The inquiry into the defendant's "ready complaisance" seems to ensure a finding of predisposition whenever the crime is committed without prolonged hesitation. The use of character evidence to prove predisposition presents problems of prejudice and creates two laws of entrapment, one for those with criminal records and one for those with clean slates. For these reasons, the subjective view of entrapment is unsound in theory and unfair in practice. The focus on the defendant's character is misplaced and should be abandoned in favor of a test that is concerned with police practices.
B. The Objective Approach
Police misconduct in undercover operations is the focus of the objective view of the entrapment defense. The objective approach was articulated in the concurring opinions of Justice Roberts in Sorrells 10 and Justice Frankfurter in Sherman. " Both Frankfurter and Roberts rejected the majority's reliance on a defendant's predisposition as a method of defining and limiting impermissible entrapment techniques. Instead, they spoke of executive lawlessness and judicial integrity. Roberts deplored the idea of a court's defiling "the purity of its own temple" by opening its doors to "such prostitution of the criminal law." '12 Frankfurter was particularly critical of the use of prejudicial evidence to establish predisposition. He argued that " [n] o matter what the defendant's past record and present inclinations to criminality, or the depths to which he has sunk in the estimation of society, certain police conduct to ensnare him into further crime is not to be tolerated by an advanced society." 11 8
Neither concurrence set down clear rules about how an objective entrapment defense might work. Roberts' view, which has not gained wide acceptance even among adherents of the objective approach, was that the issue of entrapment can be raised by the defendant or the judge (since it is the sanctity of the judicial temple that is being compromised) at any point in the proceedings. 11 Frankfurter adhered to the more orthodox view of treating the entrapment issue exclusively as a defense, but he did not subscribe to the pretense that the defendant is actually innocent. The hypothetical-person standard is closely related to the tort law concept of the reasonable person.
11 7 The reasonable person standard measures the conduct and reactions of the defendant against those of an imaginary reasonable person."' Under the hypothetical-person standard, a court "objectively" evaluates the propriety of police conduct by asking what the average law-abiding citizen would have done under the I" See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, J., concurring); see also Rotenberg, supra note 12, at 902 (arguing that the trial and appellate courts, as well as the defendant, should be able to raise the entrapment issue). (1962) . The supporters of the subjective approach point to the anomalous results likely to occur under an application of the hypothetical-person doctrine. They argue that "nondisposed" defendants will be convicted when police inducements are deemed appropriate, while "predisposed" defendants will be acquitted because police activities were impermissible. See Park, supra note 13, at 216-17. Advocates of the objective approach respond that it is an acceptable compromise to let criminals go free because the constable blundered. Procedurally, the subjective and objective approaches differ in that the latter generally does not permit the admission of "prejudicial" evidence. But see id. at 201-09 (arguing that evidence of predisposition bearing on the propriety of police conduct should be admitted under the hypotheticalperson standard and finding that several jurisdictions support admitting such evidence). The most important procedural difference between the two approaches is that the objective approach leaves the decisionmaking authority in the hands of the judge so that proper standards for police encouragement techniques can be developed. See id. at 268. But cf id. at 269-70 (noting with respect to the objective approach the advantages of allowing the jury to decide the entrapment issue). [Vol. 133:1193 REPLACING THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE same circumstances. To say that this inquiry provides an objective measure of police practices is sheer pretense. By focusing on the defendant, the hypothetical-person standard gauges police conduct only in relation to the defendant's character or predisposition.
Because this minority approach requires the defendant to match the moral integrity and self-control of the hypothetical person, it neither objectively evaluates police tactics nor declines to consider the defendant's predisposition." 9 By presupposing a universal behavioral norm, the hypothetical-person approach establishes criteria of morality by which to evaluate a defendant's reactions to police inducements, rather than independent standards by which to measure the legality of those inducements.
,Indirectly, at least, the defendant's past and other situational factors will still be used to obtain a conviction under the objective approach. Persons with unsavory histories, inhabitants of certain environments, and people made desperate by some emotional, social, or economic crisis will arguably not meet the hypothetical standard of morality. Like the supersensitive or eggshell plaintiffs of tort law, 120 individuals unable to meet the hypothetical-person standard have a lower level of tolerance or endurance than the rest of us. We are not all made of the same hearty stuff, 12 and it does not seem fair that we should be 119 Several commentators have pointed out the objective view's reliance on predisposition. See, e.g., Dix, supra note 14, at 254 ("Even under the minority 'objective' test, predisposition is quintessential; whether the methods used invoke entrapment depends upon whether they create a substantial risk that an offense would be committed by persons hypothetically reasonable and unpredisposed."); Goldstein, supra note 12, at 690 ("Frankfurter's opinion tends to blur the focus on the conduct of authorities by apparently restoring some relevance to making a distinction, however indistinct, between criminally and non-criminally prone citizens. He thus reintroduces the very element which formed the basis of his challenge to the majority of the Court.") (footnote omitted); Park, supra note 13, at 245 ("[T]he only difference [between the objective standard and the subjective standard] is that the fact-finder is asked to consider the impact of an inducement upon an imaginary nondisposed person instead of a real defendant."); Seidman, supra note 14, at 120 ("[I]n most cases, both the objective and subjective approaches would permit an inducement, so long as the defendant is predisposed."). 121 In certain instances, the hypothetical-person standard will take account of individual weakness. See Park, supra note 13, at 173-74. However, the weaknesses accounted for are likely to be only those of which the hypothetical person can be proud, like sentiment and sympathy. See, e.g., Sherman, 356 U.S. at 383-84 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Seidman, supra note 14, at 122 (explaining Sherman and Sorrells under the hypothetical-person standard by arguing that an average person might respond to the sentimental pleas of an officer); cf Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441 (opinion espousing subjective standard mentions officer's appeal to sentiment). evaluated as if we were. Just because the defendant is more vulnerable to temptation than the average law-abiding citizen, it is not apparent that any legitimate purpose is served by subjecting that individual to a randomly administered morality test. In fact, one can argue that the weak are far more in need of protection from police encouragement than the strong.
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Even assuming that the hypothetical-person standard is a fair device for determining when the entrapment defense should prevail, how can we measure the fortitude of the average law-abiding citizen? Do we really know what this individual is capable of? 2 ' The new syndicated television program, "'People Will Do Anything For Money," ' 2 4 raises serious questions about how strong a barrier human dignity can erect against human greed. Therefore, for both theoretical and practical reasons, it is better to focus the inquiry upon police misconduct.
C. Police Misconduct
If the entrapment defense has any justification in logic or public policy, its function must be to define the reach of permissible investigative activities and the limitations within which law enforcement officers may be allowed to induce the citizenry to commit illegal acts. Deterring police misconduct is a more logical and workable goal than the slippery goal of protecting the "otherwise innocent." Of course, the two policy goals are not mutually exclusive. The concern over the integrity of police practices in the entrapment area is grounded on the fear that such unrestrained activity will do more than just root out elusive criminals, that it will actually create crime and corrupt the innocent. At the same time, defendants will tend to look more like innocent victims if the police activity is objectively offensive.' 2 5
Several different areas of concern are included under the police misconduct rubric: judicial integrity," 2 " the perversion of law enforce-122 Cf Seidman, supra note 14, at 135-36 (arguing that in actuality average lawabiding citizens should be better able to resist police enticements).
12 Cf Rotenberg, supra note 12, at 900 (arguing that police would not be able to identify the degree of encouragement that would be resisted by law-abiding citizens but not by ready-and-willing criminals).
124 "Anything for Money" (Paramount Television Domestic Productions 1985; Fred Travelena, host) ("Once again we've taken our cameras out into the field to see how much it would take to involve people in situations they would normally avoid."). 127 and the creation of crimes that would not have been committed otherwise"" are a few of the predominant concerns. On a practical note, judges and commentators have complained about the waste of investigative resources that would be better devoted to the elimination of preexisting crime.
1 29 Some commentators have expressed the concern that police inducement tactics are likely to be directed at disfavored groups 30 or used for political reasons. 1 " Others share a distaste for random virtue tests conducted by the government.
13 2 The more pessimistic observers of the human species harbor a fear that any one of us might not be strong enough to resist temptation or cynically believe that every one of us has a price. 33 For those who still trust in the basic 127 See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (condemning "enforcement of the law by lawless means"); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 454, 457 (Roberts, J., concurring) (characterizing an entrapment scheme as a "revolting . . . plan" and a "prostitution of the criminal law"), quoted in Russell, 411 U.S. at 439 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 425 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (purpose of the entrapment defense should be to protect the government "from illegal conduct of the officers"). 128 See EDWARDS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 10 ("To the extent that the investigations involved created crimes, or 'scams,' a conviction obtained does not necessarily indicate that crime has been reduced, unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the individual convicted was in fact involved or about to be involved in the same criminal activity prior to the scam."); Dix, supra note 14, at 256 ("[L]ittle basis exists for predicting how likely it is that such an offense would be committed if law enforcement personnel did not interfere.").
129 See, 133 See, e.g., Sherman, 356 U.S. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Human nature is weak enough and sufficiently beset by temptations without government adding to them and generating crime."); Seidman, supra note 14, at 150 (claiming that the goodness of human nature, there is nevertheless a feeling that our privacy and personal integrity should not be invaded without good reason. 134 This concern is particularly relevant when entrapment schemes involve the infiltration of friendships... and certain privileged relationships." 3 6 Finally, for some observers, any aggressive undercover activity by law enforcement bespeaks the creation of a police state and must, therefore, be strenuously monitored.
3 7
Perhaps the most troublesome consequence of a police encouragement program unrestrained by any kind of anterior justification is the impact of the scam on the target who is not only innocent of any crime before the fact, but who, by refusing the inducement, manages to remain uncompromised. The rights of these wary innocents' 3 8 cannot be existence of the entrapment defense is necessitated by the widespread belief "that many of us would succumb to the temptation to which only some of us are daily subjected"). Senator Daniel Inouye, advocating support of Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., stated,
Instead of finding corruption, [Abscam] proved that perhaps all of us are ultimately corruptible. We must live with our weaknesses as human beings, each in our own way.
It is not, however, the business of the executive branch to test for weaknesses in any Member of Congress or to attempt to discover at what point the uncorrupt can be corrupted.
128 CONG. REC. S1472 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1982) . 134 See, e.g., Note, The Defense of Entrapment, supra note 14, at 68 ("A citizen suffers a deprivation of . . . liberty both when he becomes the target of police seductions and when the state judicial machinery imposes criminal sanctions."). 185 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 787 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The impact of. . . third-party bugging, must. . . be considered such as to undermine that confidence and sense of security in dealing with one another that is characteristic of individual relationships between citizens in a free society."); cf. Dix, supra note 14, at 211 n.9 (discussing the adverse effects of government infiltration on the relationships of members of "Vietnam Veterans Against the War").
1'" Under The Attorney General's Guidelines on FBI Undercover Operations, reprinted in SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 536, undercover operations in which agents or individuals working with the FBI pose as attorneys, physicians, or reporters can be authorized only by the Director of the FBI. See id. at 541-42. If an actual practitioner in such a privileged relationship comes forth to provide confidential information to the FBI, the FBI must notify the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division, discourage the individual from breaching the confidence, and accept the information only if serious consequences would result from rejection of the offer. See id. at 527. 113 See United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 612-13 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (comparing the techniques of the FBI in Abscam to those of the Gestapo), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); EDWARDS COMMITTEE REPORT, Supra note 6, at 77 (Indiscriminate targeting of subjects is "more the hallmark of a police state than a free society.").
138 Cf. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372 (distinguishing between traps for the unwary innocent and traps for the unwary criminal). The concern for protecting the rights of the innocent is manifested in other areas of criminal procedure. The state does, on occasion, arrest and prosecute individuals who are innocent of the crimes charged, just as the FBI sometimes attempts to induce crimes by individuals who do not succumb to [Vol. 133:1193
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vindicated by either of the mainstream entrapment doctrines." 3 9 Two subjects of the Abscam operation who did not succumb to temptation continued to feel guilty, compromised, distrustful, and uncertain long after their names had been cleared."" Thus, it is disingenuous to say that undercover inducements come with their own built-in protection and safeguard, the target's ability to say "NO!" 4 " Willpower may protect the wary innocents against the commission of crime, but it is no protection for their interest in psychic privacy 14 2 or unbesmirched reputhe temptation. The difference is that in the trial and arrest contexts, procedural protections exist that prevent prosecution and arrest of any individual without good cause. The approach advocated in this Comment would not preclude the use of inducement schemes that have innocent individuals as targets. It would merely provide innocent persons with the same procedural protection that they, and the guilty, aie afforded in the context of orthodox criminal procedure. 139 See Hearings, supra note 9, at 977-78 (testimony of Jerry J. Berman, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union) (recognizing implicitly that the safeguards used by Abscam agents would not protect innocent individuals under either the subjective or objective standard). 961 (1983) . 142 Other safeguards, such as requiring agents to make clear the illegal nature of the proposed activity or to model the activity as closely as possible on a realistic situation, also fail to protect the privacy interests of innocent individuals. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 960-61 (testimony of Jerry J. Berman, Legislative Counsel, American
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tation. These evils can be avoided through clarification and codification of threshold standards that must be met before any police encouragement operation can be initiated. Only then will "the inducement become[ ] a confirmation of criminality rather than a testing of virtue." 4 "
III. REASONABLE SUSPICION
A. Anterior Justification In many instances, consensual crimes can be prosecuted only through the use of police encouragement.
1 44 Because government officials must have flexibility in conducting such investigations, 4 5 this Comment opposes per se rules aimed at prohibiting particular police practices deemed unsavory. 14 Rather, the approach taken balances the competing concerns of law enforcement and civil liberties. The aim of this approach is the prevention, to the greatest degree possible, of the offering of inducements to the nondisposed, both the unwary and the wary innocents.
1 4 7 Such prevention would serve the interests of the targeted person and, at the same time, enhance police efficiency: inducement techniques would be available only for use against suspects who truly pose a danger to society. 4 Police encouragement practices should be limited by a requirement of reasonable suspicion of criminal involvement, 49 determined prior to the initiation of the operation. 5
Civil Liberties Union ] probable cause standard would be the death knell to undercover operations."); cf. Dix, supra note 14, at 220 (arguing that a standard less stringent than probable cause should be adopted to enable police to obtain evidence to make arrests). "Reasonable suspicion," a somewhat lower standard of anterior justification, was advanced by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to provide guidance to police when conducting a "stop and frisk." To justify a stop and frisk, the Court held, the officer must be able to cite "specific and articulable facts"-bare "hunches" would not suffice. 151 Many observers agree. See, e.g., SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 377; Dix, supra note 14, at 257. As a response to Abscam, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti promulgated guidelines for proper investigative procedures in undercover operations, which, although newly promulgated, had purportedly been in place during the Abscam operation. See The Attorney General's Guidelines on Criminal Investigations and Organizations, reprinted in SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 504-16; The Attorney General's Guidelines on FBI Undercover Operations, reprinted in SELET COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 536-55; The Attorney General's Guidelines on FBI Use of Informants and Confidential Sources, reprinted in SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 517-30. The guidelines require that investigations be initiated only when "facts or circumstances . . . 'reasonably indicate' [that] a federal criminal violation has occurred, is occurring, or will occur." The Attorney General's Guidelines on Criminal Investigations of Individuals and Organizations, reprinted in SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 506. To insure that potential targets are protected from the investigative zeal of agents in the field, the guidelines set up an internal review structure to check that operations have prior justification. See The Attorney General's Guidelines on FBI Undercover Operations, reprinted in SE-LECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 538-48.
Implicit in the decision of the Department of Justice to promulgate investigative guidelines is the assumption that the guidelines will be followed by agents. However, recent experience refutes this supposition. See EDWARDS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 7 ("The record in [Operation Corkscrew, an investigation into case-fixing by the Cleveland judiciary] demonstrates that virtually every one of the principal safeguards was either directly violated, ignored, or administratively construed in a manner inconsistent with [its] 
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strictures are followed, investigators should be required to secure a warrant from a "neutral and detached magistrate" ' 152 for the authorization of any inducement. 15 Some observers who have considered the feasibility of a warrant in the entrapment context reject the idea. See, e.g., SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 387-89 (opposition to undercover warrant legislation conditioned on belief that federal law enforcement agencies will be able to regulate themselves effectively); Hearings, supra note 9, at 931 (statement of Kenneth R. Feinberg, Esq., Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, Washington, D.C.) (arguing that such a warrant would violate separationof-powers principles). Other observers favor the use of the warrant procedure. See ED-WARDS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 10, 71-72 (recommending judicial warrant requirement "for ongoing and continuing undercover operations" because the internal review mechanism currently in place does not provide the independence of judgment and objectivity required to evaluate the sufficiency of the factual predicate); Wilson, The Real Issues in Abscam, Wash. Post, July 15, 1982, at A19, col. 2 (advocating prior judicial review when congressional figures are targeted to protect separation of powers); see also Hearings, supra note 9, at 996-1000 (testimony of Jerry J. Berman, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union) (arguing for a warrant requirement but, as a politically feasible alternative, urging that the FBI adopt the internal review procedures outlined in the Undercover Operations Guidelines, as recommended by the Select Committee, see SELlcr COMMrrTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 347-49 allegedly committed or about to be committed; 15 6 (3) the grounds on which this belief is based and the reasons why those grounds are reliable; 157 (4) an explanation of why the enforcement goal cannot be achieved through any less intrusive means; 15 and (5) the structure of the proposed inducement. The structure requirement would demand a description of the agent's general plan of action and an assurance that the plan is as narrowly .tailored as possible to achieve the permissible law enforcement goals described in the first two sections of the affidavit.
15 1
Compliance with the warrant procedure could be raised by the defendant in a pretrial motion and evaluated in a pretrial hearing. 6 If crime).
155 Cf 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv) (1982) (similar requirement for wiretapping). This requirement aims at preventing "fishing expeditions" among people not reasonably suspected of crime. It is a way of restraining agents and informants from operating on whims. See supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
56 Cf 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(i) (1982) (similar requirement for wiretapping). This requirement also protects against fishing expeditions.
157 This requirement is the heart of the application, because it forces an officer to set out the grounds for reasonable suspicion and allows an evaluation of the warrant application's persuasiveness. In this way, officers will be prevented from going ahead with mere "hunches" or "smell [s] ." See supra note 149; see also EDWARDS COMMIT-TEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 84 (recommending that warrant "application provide a full and complete statement of facts and circumstances relied upon").
18 Cf 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (1982) (similar requirement for wiretapping). Because of the impact of entrapment techniques on privacy interests, see supra note 20, the large expenditure of resources required by many undercover operations, see supra note 129 and accompanying text, and the inability to be entirely certain that the subject would have committed the illegality without police encouragement, supra note 128, use of entrapment techniques should be limited to situations in which they are truly necessary. See also EDWARDS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 84 (recommending that undercover operations "be used only upon a showing that normal investigations have been unsuccessful, or are unlikely to succeed, or constitute a danger to lives or property").
159 Cf 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(d) (1982) (limitation on duration of wiretap). This requirement aims at ensuring that the plan of action anticipated by the applying officer is justified by the grounds for suspicion, the target, and the potential crime. Otherwise, the officer might be able to get a warrant for one kind of operation and use it as a jumping-off point for entirely different projects. Although the Department of Justice Guidelines require, in lieu of a warrant, that authorization applications for undercover operations be submitted to supervisory personnel, see The Attorney General's Guidelines on FBI Undercover Operations, reprinted in SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 539-48, experience shows that the Guidelines are not always followed. The original Abscam operation, aimed at the recovery of stolen art and securities, was duly authorized by FBI Headquarters. Its subsequent shifts, however-first to the political scene in New Jersey and later to the United States Congress-were never reported or submitted for approval to a supervisory authority. See SELET COMMrTTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 16; see also supra note 151 (describing other instances in which agents neglected to follow procedural guidelines).
1-0 Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1982) (similar procedure for wiretapping). In Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 437-38 (1932), the government argued unsuccessfully that the defendant should raise any claim of entrapment in a pretrial motion.
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the inducement activity is found to have been justified and warranted, the hearing will be followed by an ordinary criminal trial. If the defendant prevails on the motion, there will be an absolute bar to prosecution. 16 Thus, the claim of entrapment, like the claim of illegal search and seizure, will not form part of the defendant's case at trial.
On a procedural level, this approach will be an improvement over current practice. First, once it has been determined that setting the defendant at liberty is the appropriate sanction for inappropriate police solicitation, a bar to prosecution is more consistent with our criminal law and procedure than an acquittal. The defendant is set free not because of innocence but because public policy dictates that the state's misfeasance bars prosecution. 16 2 Second, the pretrial motion will be entertained by the judge, thereby keeping prejudicial information from the jury and ensuring that entrapment case law will be developed by the judiciary. Finally, the defendant will be spared the dilemma of admitting factual guilt in order to assert the defense of entrapment.
63
The reasonable-suspicion inquiry required for issuance of the warrant improves on the test for predisposition under the current subjective approach to entrapment in two important respects. First, the inquiry will be conducted by a magistrate before the commencement of the undercover operation. Unless government officials can show that they reasonably suspect that the target is involved in ongoing criminal activities, and that it will be difficult to catch the suspect without undercover inducement, there will be no sting or scam at all. The antecedent judicial inquiry reduces the likelihood that overzealous agents will lure wary innocents into crime. Moreover, because the magistrate's reasonable-suspicion inquiry will be held prior to commencement of the operation, evidence of the target's ready complaisance in committing the offense will not be considered."' The "evidentiary bootstrapping" 16 5 that bedevils the present inquiry into predisposition will therefore be eliminated.
Second, the magistrate will consider evidence only of a current criminal career. Indications of recent criminal activity for which the subject has not been arrested or indicted would be particularly relevant, for it is just such activity that makes the target the appropriate subject 161 A proposal by the American Civil Liberties Union would also provide for civil damages to enforce the warrant requirement. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 999 (testimony of Jerry J. Berman, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union).
. 62 of a police encouragement operation. 66 Information about the target's prior propensity for crime, such as allegations and reports of previous unindicted activities, arrests, or convictions, might be considered if it is sufficiently connected with the target's present criminal involvement. However, the mere fact of prior criminality would not suffice to establish reasonable suspicion. The proposed reasonable-suspicion inquiry is based on a recognition that past conduct in itself is not indicative of present criminal involvement, just as it is not a barometer for determining predisposition. 1 67 Because the reasonable-suspicion inquiry obviates reliance on evidence of the target's ready complaisance or past conduct, it is less circular, tenuous, and unfair than the inquiry into predisposition used under the present subjective approach to entrapment.
B. Codifying the Warrant Requirement
Although any statute codifying the principles described in this Comment would probably not be based directly on the fourth amendment, 6 " such a statute would nevertheless borrow heavily from fourth amendment jurisprudence both in its procedures, including the warrant requirement and the pretrial hearing, and in its concerns with anterior justification, 6 9 flexibility, 170 and reasonableness. 1 7 ' Besides setting 166 See Dix, supra note 14, at 256-57. 117 See supra text accompanying notes 97-104. 168 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. It is clear that the Supreme Court is becoming less receptive to claims of fourth amendment violations. See, e.g., United States v. Johns, 105 S. Ct. 881 (1985) (upholding a warrantless search of packages three days after they had been removed from vehicles that police had probable cause to believe contained contraband); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985) (upholding a school administrator's warrantless search of a high school student's purse on the grounds that the fourth amendment does not require school officials to obtain a warrant before searching a student and that searches of students by school officials are not subject to the probable cause requirement); cf Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (use of secret government informant not covered by the fourth amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and seizures). Thus, any reform in the entrapment area will have to come from Congress. 169 See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-82 (1963) (with or without warrant, arresting officer needs more than mere suspicion to make an arrest).
170 See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-14 (1975) (policeman's on-thescene assessment of probable cause provides legal justification for arresting a suspect); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-71 (1971) (police can seize items in "plain view" while executing a search warrant that names other objects).
"I' See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 743 (1985) ("The fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be reasonable . . . ."); cf. Dix, supra note 14, at 294 (proposing that the Supreme Court adopt the view that "deception [by undercover agents] constitutes a 'Search' within the meaning of the fourth amendment. This action would make the flexible concept of reasonableness available for development of the basic limitations on undercover investigations essential to the drawing of well-founded operational rules.") though some circumstances may call for such techniques. Finally, the validity of repeated urgings will vary from situation to situation and will require greater reliance on the independent judgment of the officer on the scene.
CONCLUSION
The high stakes and drama that characterized the Abscam and DeLorean operations illustrate vividly both the appeal and the danger of elaborate, high-visibility undercover scams. The targets in these operations were not of the highest moral caliber, as they demonstrated by yielding to the temptations offered, but that does not necessarily mean that they would have committed like crimes in the absence of FBI encouragement.
There is something very frightening about the notion that the police are free to test the morality of individual citizens without restraint. To address this fear, this Comment has argued that law enforcement officials should be required to demonstrate reasonable suspicion that an individual is engaging in criminal conduct before they will be authorized to test that individual's penchant for illegal transactions. Furthermore, reasonableness should govern every stage of the operation, so that investigations validly initiated remain justified.
The Burger Court is cutting away at the body of law developed by the Warren Court to protect individuals from overreaching by law enforcement bodies. Large-scale undercover operations like Abscam provide these institutions with unprecedented power to interfere with our lives. It is up to Congress to restrain this power by enacting certain and enforceable limits on the ability of the executive branch to lead citizens into temptation.
